

**Weather Underground Informant
Larry Grathwohl cites evidence from
Bill Ayers that Bernardine Dohrn was
personally involved in a bombing that
killed a San Francisco policeman**

"In 1995, State Senator Alice Palmer introduced her chosen successor, Barack Obama, to a few of the district's influential liberals at the home of two well known figures on the local left: William Ayers and Bernardine Dohrn."

- Source: The Politico <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0208/8630.html>

"The FBI was in possession of intelligence information that showed that the Weather Underground Organization terrorists...murdered a police officer in San Francisco with one of their bombs..."

- Roy Cohn, Foreword to "Outlaws of Amerika: The Weather Underground Organization."

THE OBAMA VERSION:

CHARGES AGAINST AYERS WERE DROPPED AND HE SERVED NO TIME

1979: Charges Against Ayers Were Dropped Because "The Government's Case Was Based On Illegal Wiretaps." The New York Times reported, "William Ayers was a fugitive, too, for nine of those years, but the Federal charges against him, Miss Dohrn and other members of the revolutionary organization were dropped in 1979, when it was ruled that the Government's case was based on illegal wiretaps." [New York Times, 12/5/80]

Ayers "Served No Time." "William Ayers: Surrendered and pleaded guilty in 1980 to possession of explosives and served no time. Teaches early childhood development at the University of Illinois." [Boston Globe, 9/19/93]

Source: Barack Obama website <http://factcheck.barackobama.com/factcheck2/2008/04/>

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Victim of Park Station Bombing

Memorial Scheduled for Sergeant Brian V. McDonnell

By Irene Michaud
Tenderloin Station

For the officers of Park Station, the night of February 16, 1970 seemed like a normal routine watch. Officers Ron Martin #1324 and Al Arnaud #7 were outside inspecting their radio car, which was parked at the side of the station. Inside the station, it was business as usual for Officers Robert O'Sullivan #44, Gerald Doherty #1441, and Edward Buckner #1484. Officer Robert Fogarty* #255 was standing at a desk talking to Officer Frank Rath #549. Sergeant Paul Kotta #845 was standing in the assembly room looking at a vehicle hot sheet, and Sergeant Brian V. McDonnell #1001 was standing in the doorway off the office and the main squad room.

At approximately 2244 hours, a pipe bomb exploded rocking the stillness of the night in the Park District. The force of the bomb's explosion was strong enough that the switchboard at the Hall of Justice was busy receiving calls from frightened residents of the Sunset and Richmond districts. An unknown subject or subjects had placed a bomb on the window ledge of Park Station, where the above officers were working.

Officers Martin and Arnaud, who were standing several feet from the window ledge, were knocked to the ground and sustained injuries from the flying glass. The blast, which at the time was described by police officials, as the "loudest and deadliest" detonated in San Francisco in recent memory caused Officers Doherty and Buckner to suffer hearing impairment and shock. Sergeant Kotta was knocked to the floor of the assembly room unconscious. Officer Fogarty had suffered multiple severe wounds on his face, cheek and legs from the flying fragments and glass. Officers O'Sullivan and Rath were also injured by the flying pieces of debris.

Sergeant McDonnell caught the full force of the flying shrapnel, which consisted of heavy metal staples and lead bullets. As other officers tried rendering aid to the fallen sergeant, they could see that he sustained a severed neck artery wound and severe wounds to his eyes and neck. He was transported to San Francisco General Hospital, where doctors attempted

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OCC Audit report



Sergeant Brian V. McDonnell

vallantly to save his life. Two days later, Sergeant Brian V. McDonnell succumbed to his injuries and died on February 18, 1970.

Thirty-seven years have past since this tragic and senseless act of violence. Members of the San Francisco Police Officers Association have organized a memorial to dedicate a plaque in memory of Sergeant Brian V. McDonnell. All active and retired members are welcome to attend this memorial, which will be held at Park Station on February 16, 2007 at noon.

**Officer Fogarty died on January 12, 2007. He was retired from the SFPD one year after the explosion due to disabling injuries. He had joined the SFPD on April 1, 1950, continuing a long Fogarty family tradition of service to the SFPD dating back to 1901.*

President's Message

By Gary Delagnes,
SFPOA President

As I contemplate the four "line of duty" deaths that we have suffered over the past 2 years, in addition to several deaths that we have seen away from the job, the latest being the inexplicable passing of Jack Santos Jr., it gives me pause and time reflect on what this job is really all about.

In May of 1979, I stood on the steps of City Hall with less than 1 year as a police officer I watched over 30 of my fellow officers go down under a barrage of bricks, rocks, and other life threatening objects. The Police administration would not release us from our fixed posts on the steps of City Hall for fear of an over reaction by police officers to an out of control, hostile crowd. Over 30 cops went DP that night and I watched over ten radio cars burn to the ground while we stood by and did nothing. I can still remember the walling of the sirens as a result of those fires and that sound will be forever imbedded in my mind. An older cop standing next to me that night looked over at me and said, "Kid, it can't get any worse than this".

That was the now infamous "White Night" when rioting erupted following the Dan White verdict. It was also my first experience as a young police officer observing the politics of city government, and also the first time I realized that many people do not see us as human beings but as a tool by which they can promote their own personal agendas and try to rectify their private discontent.

When I returned to college in 1980, my senior thesis was titled, "The Reasons for Low Morale in a Major Metropolitan Police Department."

I have also found, through personal experience over the span of 29 years that one's definition of "morale" can change many times.

As a membership, we have been



President Gary Delagnes

through a lot over the past 3 years. We have lost several comrades. We have been subject to an inane disciplinary process that subjects our officers to the incompetence of the OCC; we watch the weekly circus that is our police commission "playing to the crowd"; we observe the regular Chronicle hit pieces on our hard-working officers; and, most recently, we are now being subjected to the so-called Early Intervention System that will further demoralize our members.

Not unlike 28 years ago, we remain the political pawns in a gratuitous and pandering political system, and more to the point, to elected and appointed officials who just doesn't know what to make of us.

Joaquin Antonio Santos

POA Mourns Death of Member from Northern Station

The men and women of the San Francisco Police Officers Association extend sympathy and condolences to the family and friends of Joaquin Antonio Santos of Northern Station. "Big Jack" died unexpectedly on January 12, 2007 while recovering from surgery. He was 39.

Joaquin was a member of the 178th SFPD Academy Class. He served at the Tenderloin Task Force before transferring to Northern Station. He leaves behind his wife Jennifer and their two children, Madeline age 6, and Jack Michael age 3. Joaquin was the loving son of retired DC Joaquin Santos and stepmother, SFPD Lt. Teri Barrett.

Donations can be made to the Madeline and Jack Santos Scholarship Fund at the SF Police Credit Union, 2550 Irving St, SF, CA 94122.

Not unlike 28 years ago, we remain the political pawns in a gratuitous and pandering political system, and more to the point, to elected and appointed officials who just doesn't know what to make of us.

The messages sent by these amateur law enforcement know-it-alls are confusing and conflicting. Most of the messages are reactive, and are spurred in a moment to mollify whichever of the regular "community" nut jobs happens to be pounding the podium at the time.

"Lower the homicide rate" they

see PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, page 3

TERRORISTIC ACTIVITY

Inside the Weatherman Movement

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PART 2

OCTOBER 18, 1974

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J. G. SOURWINE, *Chief Counsel*
ALFONSO L. TARABOCHIA, *Chief Investigator*
MARY DOOLEY, *Acting Director of Research*

RESOLUTION

Resolved, by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, that the testimony of Larry Grathwohl, taken in executive session on October 18, 1974, be released from the injunction of secrecy, be printed and made public.

JAMES O. EASTLAND,
Chairman.

Approved January 23, 1975.

¹ Resigned from U.S. Senate as of December 31, 1974.

² Resigned from U.S. Senate as of December 27, 1974.

(II)

TERRORISTIC ACTIVITY—INSIDE THE WEATHERMAN MOVEMENT

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1974

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:45 a.m., in room 2300, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond presiding.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Alfonso Tarabochia, chief investigator, and Robert Short, senior investigator.

Senator THURMOND. The committee will come to order.

The evidence you shall give in this hearing shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. I do.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF LARRY GRATHWOHL

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you give the reporter your full name, please?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. Larry Grathwohl.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your present address?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. 2212 Old Creek Place, Hayward, Calif.

Mr. SOURWINE. And when and where were you born?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. Cincinnati, Ohio, October 13, 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you married?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Any children?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. Two by a previous marriage.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was your education?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. One year of college.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think at the outset, Mr. Chairman, we should let the record speak clearly with respect to this witness's participation in activities of the so-called New Left, and especially of the Weatherman organization.

You were a member of this organization, were you not?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you come to join it?

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. When did you become an informant for the FBI?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. Right after this meeting, understanding that the Cincinnati Police Department was not equipped to handle a group like the Weathermen, I mean, they could take care of the local situation, the Cincinnati Collective.

But, when it came to understanding and preparing for the national repercussions of this group, they were limited to the Cincinnati area and they could, of course, work with various police departments, but it was stifled after that. It couldn't go on, and consequently they didn't know exactly how to handle me. You must admit it is unusual for somebody to come walking into the office and say, I am going to help you.

At the time, right after this meeting and the National Action took place, I read in the newspaper where the Senate, this committee or some other committee was having an investigation of the Weathermen. I called the Justice Department and I told them that I didn't know much, but what I did know I would tell somebody if they wanted to hear it. They said call the FBI. I called the FBI and Special Agent Clark Murrish talked to me and asked me to come in.

And so I went in and talked to him. And he said, well, why don't you go to some more meetings, and that was how that started.

Now, Clark never wanted me to go as far as I did. He wanted me to hold back more. He wanted me to be an informant from the periphery, as opposed to actually penetrating the inner Collective. But, being the kind of person I am, I couldn't, I couldn't accept that. It was like going half way and knowing that the potential existed for me to continue the penetration. I chose to do so.

And at times, Clark vehemently opposed what I was doing. I quit my job and moved into the Collective and, of course, he wanted me to go back to work.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, that was in what, late September or October of—

Mr. GRATHWOHL. This was December of 1969.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was after Chicago?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. It took me that long.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, two points. We will digress for a moment.

One, you spoke about the kind of person you are. Tell us what kind of a person you are. What have you done, what have you worked at?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. Well, up until this time, I had been in the Army for 3 years and 9 months.

Mr. SOURWINE. Serving where?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. Well, I was in Vietnam for a year; I was with the 101st Airborne Division. And then I was a drill instructor at Fort Knox when I got back from Vietnam.

Mr. SOURWINE. Rank and serial number.

Mr. GRATHWOHL. Sergeant. RA15720660.

Mr. SOURWINE. Good memory, Sergeant. Go ahead.

Mr. GRATHWOHL. So then in 1969, I was honorably discharged from the Army and went to school for a year. I would consider myself politically a liberal, moderate and conservative in other areas—law enforcement being one of my conservative areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you engaged in any political activities?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Prior to joining the Weathermen?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. No. Politically I am independent. I belong to neither party.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was it you had in mind when you said being the kind of person you were?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. Well, I don't like to start something and not finish it, and if you—in a case like this, you know, my opinion of the Weathermen are that they are a serious threat, they were then and they still are, and you can't approach a group like that with the idea of doing it halfway.

If you are going to get involved at all, you should go the whole route or not bother.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you recognize the Weatherman organization in 1969 as a serious threat to the United States?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. Yes, I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why? How did you come to that conclusion?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. I can't remember the chronology of the way things happened. But having read the newspapers and known how things developed in the New Left from the time it became noticeable, in other words, articles were being printed in the newspapers about their actions up until the Democratic Convention of 1968, at which time, they—the hippies—ran the streets and wreaked havoc on Chicago for the first time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you been a student of the New Left prior to that time?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. Not any more than anyone else.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you read any New Left newspapers?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. No. Just the newspapers like the Cincinnati Enquirer or the Cincinnati Post.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not read the underground newspapers?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. No. At the time that the national convention took place in 1968—the Democratic National Convention—I was still in the Army.

But my point is this: They were the only group that I had read anything about. Well, I should say I had not read anything about the Weathermen, but the other groups that I had read about were talking about radical changes within the system.

The Weathermen approached the subject completely different. It was no longer a question of changing the system from within. It was to destroy the system, completely destroy it, and that is what they said the first time I met them, and that is what they said the last time I was with them.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you did not have the attitude that this was kind of silly for a handful of people in Cincinnati to be thinking about destroying the Government of the United States? You took them as a serious threat from the beginning?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. Well, like I said, the very first time I saw them on the street corner I was thrown between believing they were crazy or taking them seriously.

My feelings are these: If one person, if one person on the street is killed or maimed because of these people, then they are a serious prob-

I met Bill again in February 1970, at which time he came to Cincinnati to reorganize the Collective. At this time he sent Naomi Jaffe and Mike Spiegel to Detroit and Karen Danzer to Seattle. Those three people were primary leadership in the Cincinnati Collective.

The new primary leadership was Dionne Donghi, herself, and at that time Bill and I discussed strategy in regards to Cincinnati.

I met Bill again in Detroit in February 1970. At this time, the Weathermen had gone underground. This is the, during this period of time, that I was in Detroit, was when the plan for the bombing of the Detroit Police Officers Association Building took place, and Bill was the person who directed the "focle" that I was part of to place the bomb at the DPOA Building. He designed the bomb and told me that he would get the necessary materials, the dynamite, et cetera, and about 4 days later Bill broke that focle that I was part of up, and he sent Mark Lenel, Windy Pankin and Linda Josephwich, and of those and myself. This is a four-man "focle" and we were directed to go to Madison, Wis.

I was in Madison, Wis., approximately two weeks, returned to Cincinnati, and then Naomi Jaffe directed me to go to Buffalo, New York, to be part of a new four-man "focle" which would include Naomi Jaffe, Robert Ward, Dionne Donghi and myself.

Mr. SOURWINE Now, you used the phrase "focle." Does that mean the same as task force?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. Correct. Bill Ayers showed up there, at which time we had a discussion regarding Weathermen policy changes. He had been in a meeting on the West Coast, which included the higher echelon of the Weatherman leadership. Such changes were made as consolidating Weathermen forces on the east and west coast, primarily in the New York and San Francisco areas.

The hard line that the Weathermen had taken in regards to monogamy was diluted to some degree. After this meeting took place, Bill and Naomi Jaffe went to Canada to meet with people from the Quebec Liberation Front and other people that they did not tell me about.

When he returned, we had another meeting at which time—and this is the only time that any Weathermen told me about something that someone else had done—and Bill started off telling us about the need to raise the level of the struggle and for stronger leadership inside the Weatherman "focles" and inside the Weatherman organization as a whole. And he cited as one of the real problems was that someone like Bernardine Dohrn had to plan, develop and carry out the bombing of the police station in San Francisco, and he specifically named her as the person that committed that act.

At that time Bill Ayers, or shortly after that, Bill Ayers left and went to New York City.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he indicate how he knew of Bernardine Dohrn's participation in that San Francisco bombing?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. I cannot say that he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you get the impression that he was there?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. No, I can't say that I did. It was more of a criticism of us.

Mr. SOURWINE. He didn't give any description of what took place that would indicate that he saw it?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. Yes. Well, he said that the bomb was placed on the window ledge and he described the kind of bomb that was used to the extent of saying what kind of shrapnel was used in it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he say who placed the bomb on the window ledge?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. Bernardine Dohrn.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he say it in a way that would indicate that he was there and saw it?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. Well, if he wasn't there to see it, somebody who was there told him about it, because he stated it very emphatically.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not tell you who told him?

Mr. GRATHWOHL. No; he did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. GRATHWOHL. I met Bill again in New York City. The Buffalo collective was reassigned to New York City and upon arriving in New York City, that very night I had another meeting with Bill Ayers. I should say that the focle had a meeting, all three of us were there, and we were told then that someone on the national leadership would be in contact with us, that our purpose in New York was strategic sabotage and to try to organize other focles on the pyramid theory, and that I would be in contact with us later.

That is the last time that I saw Bill Ayers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, the name of the next individual whose picture you recognize.

Mr. GRATHWOHL. I am sorry, but I do not recognize him.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you do not recognize, you do not need to say so, simply lay it aside. I want you to give us the names of those you do recognize and tell us what you know about them in each case.

Mr. GRATHWOHL. John Fuerst. I met John the first time at the national council meeting in Flint in December 1969. Conversations with him were extremely limited at that time.

I met Fuerst again in February 1970 at a meeting that took place in Cleveland, Ohio, at which time I learned Fuerst was the primary leadership of the Cleveland collective. During this meeting that took place in Cleveland—let me see, Mark Rudd and Linda Evans were there and Leonard Handlesman, Celeste McCullough, Bobby Joe Smith, Mark Real, and that's about all of the names that I can remember right off the top of my head, besides members from the Cincinnati collective.

I should identify them too. Dionne Donghi, and these are members of the Cincinnati Weathermen Collective that were at this meeting: Dionne Donghi, Robert Skardis, Robert Ward, Courtney Esposito, Carol Hoppi, and Arlow Jacobs, whose real name is Robert Burlingham. And that's the Cincinnati people at this meeting that took place in Cleveland, and it is the one where the Weathermen had decided to go underground.

And Linda Evans and Mark Rudd had two meetings during that period of time, at which we were instructed that the Weathermen were going underground with the idea of setting up underground focles with strategic sabotage against the symbols of authority within the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

BRINGING DOWN AMERICA

**An FBI Informer
with the Weathermen**

Larry Grathwohl
as told to Frank Reagan



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intendent of the building identified several Weathermen from FBI photos, including Dohrn, Boudin, and Ayers, as being in the apartment. So I assumed that's where the latest Weather Bureau meeting had been held.

"First," Ayers was saying, "we're going to change our strategy. For the last couple of months we have had many small focals working in a number of cities across the country. Now we're going to concentrate on the major metropolitan areas on both coasts so we can solidify our power. New York and San Francisco will be our major bases. We'll remain active in Chicago, however, and possibly in the Denver area."

He said the decision to concentrate on the major coast cities was made because of the vast number of working people in these areas who were ripe for the revolution. "The blacks, the Puerto Ricans, the poor whites, and the Mexicans in those areas represent a tremendous segment of the population. By rallying them to our side we can bring down the cities. Once this is accomplished, it will be a simple matter to get the rest of the country to fall in line."

"What about our projects in Buffalo?" Carter asked.

Ayers said they'd be postponed, but not cancelled.

"You still have a few days left up here," he said, "and any major project in the works will be considered for a later date."

His next announcement concerned social philosophy within the Weathermen. "Monogamous relationships will no longer be banned," he stated. "If two people are working in harmony for the revolution, they can have a close relationship as long as it doesn't take precedence over the movement. If it does, the relationship will have to be terminated. We believe people can work and live together for the common goal."

Ayers enjoyed delivering these dicta to his subjects. He paced around the room emphasizing certain points by throwing his fist into the air in the power salute.

When he finished outlining our new codes, he tore into a fiery criticism of the passiveness of most members of the organization. "Too many of you are relying on your leaders to do everything," he said sternly. Then, in a departure from relating individuals to specific acts, he mentioned the park police station bombing in San Francisco.

"It was a success," he said, "but it's a shame when someone like Bernardine has to make all the plans, make the bomb, and then place it herself. She should have to do only the planning." He charged us to become more aggressive in working out details and executing plans by ourselves.

Then he announced that he and Naomi had to go to Canada for an important meeting with friends. He suggested that the rest of us spend our time getting false identifications. We were to collect as many as we could in the event that somebody else needed them. Naomi said she'd

**Outlaws of Amerika:
The Weather Underground
Organization**

Foreword

By Roy M. Cohn

During the 1970s, the American internal security and counter-intelligence community was virtually destroyed through attacks by certain publicity-seeking Senators and Congressmen, and a sensation-seeking national media which utilized selective "leaks" and disclosures in order to present a bizarre, distorted picture of the purpose and operations of the intelligence, counter-intelligence and internal security agencies.

Fortunately, and through the efforts of associates of ours and the common-sense of the voters, some of these legislators have been turned out of office—notably now ex-Senator Frank Church of Idaho, who was chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. However, important assistance to these witchhunts against the intelligence agencies was provided by an "anti-intelligence lobby" headed by the National Lawyer's Guild, a Communist-controlled organization of revolutionary lawyers; the Institute for Policy Studies, a Marxist think-tank that has been characterized as "the perfect intellectual front for Soviet activities which would be resisted if they were to originate openly from the KGB"; the Center for National Security Studies, a lobbying group set up by IPS and NLG members working with the American Civil Liberties Union.

The primary target of this anti-intelligence lobby was the Federal Bureau of Investigation because it is responsible for federal internal security and counter-intelligence programs. The main criticism of the FBI, contrary to common sense, focused on its investigations of two of the most violent revolutionary organizations in America, the terrorist Weather Underground Organization which arose from Students for a Democratic Society, and the Black Panther Party which gave birth to the terrorist Black Liberation Army.

The FBI was in possession of intelligence information that showed that the Weather Underground Organization terrorists who murdered a police officer in San Francisco with one of their bombs and who were responsible for bombings of the U.S. Capitol, State Department and government and private buildings in New York, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, San Francisco and Los Angeles were in contact with hostile foreign powers including Cuba, North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, Algeria, Czechoslovakia and the People's Republic of China; and that the WUO had contacts with foreign terrorist groups ranging from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Quebec National Liberation Front (FLQ) to the Japanese Red Army.

Yet when scapegoats for the campaign against the intelligence agencies were sought, those selected were the FBI agents responsible for catching terrorists and their leaders, Mark Felt and William Miller. Felt and Miller were prosecuted by the Carter Justice Department and his Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti for violating the civil rights and privacy of members and associates of the terrorist Weather Underground Organization. Five former Attorneys General of the United States testified that Felt and Miller had acted perfectly proper within policy from the President down approving warrantless searches in national security cases. This policy is supported by the leading United States Court of Appeals

decision on the subject, which even allowed into evidence, matter found in such a warrantless search. After a "mock" trial—I know, I was in the courtroom and testified—they were convicted in December 1980. Both men were pardoned by President Reagan in 1981. President Reagan pointed out that Carter had given amnesty to Vietnam draft dodgers, and praised Felt and Miller for their unselfish service to our country.

Coinciding with the disclosures of FBI investigations of the terrorist fugitives of the Weather Underground were guidelines for internal security investigations issued by Ford Administration Attorney General Edward Levi that effectively barred the FBI from conducting any internal security investigations.

When the Department of Justice commenced prosecution of the FBI anti-terrorist officials, members and supporters of the Weather Underground filed civil suits for damages. The leading plaintiff in these suits is Judith Clark, a public member of the Weatherman faction, who has been indicted in relation to the killings of a Brink's guard and two police officers, and the robbery of \$1.6 million in Nyack, New York, and who, it has been reported, has boasted of her ties to PLO support groups and of her visit with a leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) earlier this year.

The Weather Underground's National Lawyers Guild (NLG) attorneys used the Felt-Miller case as a prior bar against prosecution of terrorist fugitives. As WUO leaders surfaced one at a time over the past four years, they faced only minor local charges, most related to 1969 riots in Chicago. Each WUO fugitive refused to provide any information on the terrorist network and who had harbored them. No federal grand juries were impaneled to investigate. Against the warnings of veteran investigators that an extensive terrorist infrastructure was in place in the United States with strong ties to Cuba and foreign terrorist organizations, the conventional wisdom said, "it can't happen here."

But it did happen. Investigations stemming from the Nyack, New York robbery and murders have brought before the public interconnections among the Weather Underground Organization and its overt political arms and fronts, and "Third World" terrorist groups including the Puerto Rican FALN, the Black Liberation Army, the Republic of New Africa, and an in-prison network of revolutionary convicts associated with the Black Guerrilla Family.

Does the Nyack episode foreshadow a re-emergence of revolutionary terrorism and sabotage in this country? Only time will tell, but what is clear is that the anti-intelligence lobby has been far more effective than the officials of the FBI and state and local police departments prefer to admit.

As the direct result of the anti-intelligence agency campaign, the FBI is unable to send informants or undercover agents into the overt support groups for terrorist organizations from which new terrorists are recruited. The FBI cannot even collect and study literature produced by terrorist support groups in which they discuss providing "material aid" for terrorism; and cannot monitor protests by these groups to look for terrorist fugitives even when they are demonstrating outside the Justice Department on Inauguration Day. Furthermore, the CIA is still forbidden to monitor the activities of American supporters of terrorist groups when they are traveling overseas.

The Attorney General's guidelines need a thorough overhaul so that the FBI can do the job it is supposed to do—protect life and property. Three people were killed in New York City near the beginnings of the Weathermen's operation,

and much more recently, three men were killed at Nyack because past political leaders bowed to pressure from the supporters of terrorism. We must not wait for more deaths to take the necessary corrective action.

The morale and effectiveness of the FBI and the CIA are at stake. If they had not been crippled by the politicians and organizations referred to here—does anyone doubt that we would have had advance notice of the seizure of our embassy and the hostages in Iran? We cannot afford more tragedies like this.

Roy Cohn won a stellar place in the anti-Communism pantheon as Assistant U.S. Attorney battling Communist Party leaders and Soviet espionage agents. He won lasting national recognition as Senator Joseph McCarthy's aggressive chief counsel on the Senate Government Investigations Subcommittee. He practices law in New York City.